

DATA PRIVACY ON TRIAL


A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENFORCEMENT, DAMAGES, SANCTIONS, AND STANDING IN EU AND U.S. LAW

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- GDPR 2018: Turning point in Data Protection
 - Up to 20 billion € or to 4 % total worldwide annual turnover maximum fine
 - Damages to individual data subjects in times of Big Data
 - Data Protection Authorities as direct enforcerment actors: Law and Order



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
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- GDPR 2018: Turning point in Data Protection
 - "Brussels Effect"
 - Japan
 - Brazil
 - CCPA?
 - More to come...





- Heavy criticism:
 - Shooting Sparrows with Guns?
 - Hindering Innovation: Dominance of the Law over Technology?
 - European Imperialism?
 - "Can't do Anything Anymore"?

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• ...



- Cacophony of Actors: EU and Member States; Courts (CJEU, Court of Appeals (e.g. OLG Düsseldorf on competion law) and Supreme Courts, Constitutional Courts, ...), Supervisory Authorities (EDPB+D (16+1+x) + x), Law Firms (GDPR Enforcement Tracker, ...), EU Commission, Companies (Meta; TikTok; Mistral, OpenAl; ...); NGOs (Algorithm Watch, ...); ...
- [Cacophony of Laws: DSA and DMA, Data Act, Al Act, ePrivacyDirective, Al Liability Directive – and, of course, GDPR]
- Data Protection Compliance = expensive, ressourceful, strenous, complicated
- In Effect: Overregulation. Too much, too often, without proportionality.



Is that truly so?



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Does the Mix of Instruments within the GDPR Show (Over-)Extensive Use by Data Protection Authorities and other Actors?



- I. Introduction
- II. Why? Goals of Data Protection
- III. What? Enforcement Deficit
- IV. How? The Instruments
- V. Where? The Claim of Overregulation
 - 1. Dogmatics
 - 2. Fines
 - 3. Damages
 - 4. Complaints
 - 5. Principle of Proportionality
- VI. If? Frictions
- VII. And Then? Conclusion and Outlook



Data Privacy on Trial II. Why? Goals of Data Protection (European concept)

- Limited Acess to data Technology to Use Data -> Power Asymmetry
- Use of Data in Decision Making -> Power Asymmetry
- Protection of Individuality, Freedom, Autonomy = Protection of Backbone of Democracy









Data Privacy on Trial II. Why? Goals of Data Protection (European concept)

- Limited Acess to data Technology to Use Data -> Power Asymmetry
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- Protection of Individuality, Freedom, Autonomy = Protection of Backbone of Democracy
- Information as Common Good (Econ.)
 - Non-excludability
 - Non rivalry in consumption
 - -> Result: Market failure
 - -> Result: Power asymmetry



Data Privacy on Trial III. What? Enforcement Deficit

- Driver of GDPR (succeeding DPD 1995)
- Common Good Quality of information
 - Decisions ≠ information and evaluation of information behind a veil of ignorance
 - Individual information seems irrelevant; causality in result (big data, AI, mass surveillance, ...)
 - External effects in profiling: Consent of my data ≠ consent of profiled person.
 - Natural restitution impossible: "Forget, what you know!"
- -> Result: Infringements of Data Protection Rights difficult to detect and hard to prove.
- -> Result: Control and enforcement deficit



Data Privacy on Trial III. What? Enforcement Deficit

- In addition:
 - Network Effects
 - David against Goliath (Power Asymmetry)
 - Ressources of Controllers v.
 Ressources of Data Subject/DPA
 - Ignorance of Those Controlling (esp. Courts)





Data Privacy on Trial III. What? Enforcement Deficit

• Finally:

Access to Data and IT outside of Europe

Different Concepts of Protection

 Global Actors: Diversity of Normative Orders, Legal Unertainty, Diverse Rules of Standing and Access to Courts and Remedies, ...

• Not to forget:


Different Interests in Use of Data (Geopolitics)





Data Privacy on Trial IV. How? The Instruments

- "Enforcement" = Compliance with Legal Norms by Force
 - Measures Artt. 57, 58 GDPR by the Supervisory Authorities = Fines, Art. 83 GDPR, by Supervisory Authorieties = institutionalized = public law
 - Complaint to the Supervisory Authority to take measures, Art. 77 GDPR = individual
 → institutionalized = public law
 - and: Representation through NGO, Art. 80
 -> institutionalized -> private law





Data Privacy on Trial IV. How? The Instruments

- Damages, § 82 DSGVO = individual = Civil Law
- Relief/claim to abatement because of violation of personality rights etc. = individual = Civil Law
- Indirect Enforcement
 - Competition and Antitrust Law (esp. Misuse of dominant market position – CJEU C-252/21 – Meta v. BKartA)
 - and: Consumer Protection Law, Tax Law, ...





- Dogmatics: Overlaps? Ne bis in idem?
- Measure v. Fine
 - Same Authority
 - Different goals: prospektiv v. retrospektiv; expression of special negative value of wrongdoing; educatory value
- Damages: retrospektiv; compensation of losses (status quo ex ante)
- Right to lodge complaint
 - Linkage
 - But: no duty to take measures by authority (CJEU: restricted discretion (C-768/21))




- Dogmatics: Overlaps? Ne bis in idem?
- Fines from different authorities (competition, AI regulation, data protection)
 - Typically for different normative violations
 - Amount??? Consumption???



€ 4,500,688,064 Fines

app. 2.060 procedures for violations against the GDPR





Germany 2022 (2 DPAs missing):

508 fines 5.5 Mio €

Germany 2023 (2 DPAs missing):


377 fines 5.0 Mio €

2022				2023	2023				
Anzahl Bußgeld- bescheide	Gesamthöhe Bußgelder	Durchschnit t	Median		Anzahl Bußgeld- bescheide*	Gesamthöhe Bußgelder	Durchschnit t	Median	
	EUR					EUR			
		524525							
55; 1 BDSG	25.915€	,		Thüringen	32	30.740€	984,06€		Thüringen
0	0€	0	0	Bayern LDA		3.776.070€	251.738 €	251.738 €	Bayern LDA
19	145.950 €	7.681€		Baden-Württ		15.800€	1.436,36 €		Baden-Württen
4	63.271€	15.817,75€		Rheinland-P		3.930 €	436,67€		Rheinland-Pfal
15 DSGVO	60.473€	4.031,53€	450€	Hamburg	8 DSGVO	86.480€	10.810€	1.650 €	Hamburg
35	716.575€	20.473, 57€		Berlin	26	549.410€	21.131,15€		Berlin
20	200.415€	10.021€	500€	Sachsen-An	15	16.340€	1.089,33€	900€	Sachsen-Anha
				BfDI					BfDI
85/ 12 BDSG	80.350€	945€	500€	NRW	65/8 BDSG	64.650€	994€	500€	NRW
11	135.550 €	12.322,73€	2.950€	Saarland	8	208.375€	26.046,88€	850€	Saarland
13	123.000€	9.442€	350€	Brandenburg	9	13.450 €	1.495€	450€	Brandenburg
30*	2.067.070€	68.902,33€		Bremen	*32/20 rechts	147.465€	7.373,25€	900€	Bremen
113	44.350€	392,48€		Hessen	124	56.810€	458,15€		Hessen
Tätigkeitsbericht fehlt			Mecklenburg Tätigkeitsbericht fehlt				Mecklenburg-V		
				Bayern LfD					Bayern LfD
* 34	28.910€	850,29€		Sachsen	* 23	33.090€	1.438,70€		Sachsen
51/45 rechts	2,2 Mio. €	39.215, 69€		Niedersachs	Geldbußen m	nit Erstbeschei	d iHv. 5,3 Mio.	€ verhängt, ke	Niedersachsei
2 keine Angaben				Schleswig-H	0	keine Angabe	n		Schleswig-Hol
* 21 erlassen und 19 rechtskräftig.					* 51 Geldbußen insg.				




Highest fines acc to member states:

€ 2,855,363,400 (in 27 cases) by Irish DPA





 Most fines: 838 (closed) cases in Spain





 The biggest Sinners: Meta, TikTok, Amazon und Google

	Controller	Sector	Country	Fine [€]	Type of Violation	Date
1		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	IRELAND	1200000000	Insufficient legal basis for data processing	2023-05-12
2	Amazon Europe Core S.à.r.l.	Industry and Commerce	LUXEMBOURG	746000000	Non-compliance with general data processing principles	2021-07-16
3		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	IRELAND	405000000	Non-compliance with general data processing principles	2022-09-05
4		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	IRELAND	39000000	Non-compliance with general data processing principles	2023-01-04
5		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	IRELAND	345000000	Non-compliance with general data processing principles	2023-09-01
6		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	IRELAND	265000000	Insufficient technical and organisational measures to ensure information security	2022-11-25
7		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	IRELAND	225000000	Insufficient fulfilment of information obligations	2021-09-02
8		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	FRANC	90000000	Insufficient legal basis for data processing	2021-12-31
9		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	FRANCE	60000000	Insufficient legal basis for data processing	2021-12-31
10		Media, Telecoms and Broadcasting	FRANCE	60000000	Insufficient legal basis for data processing	2021-12-31



- Damages: Too much? Too often?
 - New: immaterial cost included in damages
 - Indirect Effect: Integrated Costs (cp. Learned Hand (1947): Duty of Care established acc. to cost of prevention and calculated damages (Model-T-case) -> Compliance and Internalization






- CJEU: Restrictions on immaterial damages
 - No punitive dimension; general burden-of-proof on claimant (if not violation of obligation to demonstrate, CJEU C-175/20 (2022)); need of some material connection
- Courts tend to correct damages (lower)
- Problem: No official data available; publication of Court decisions




- App. 300 Court Decisions for damages in Germany
- App. 2/3 because of illegal data sharing or It-security leaks (scraping)





- Complaints to DPAs (mandatory investigation, Art. 77 GDPR)
- Inconsistent, in Lower Saxony (VW) 2023 > 10% to 2022, but < to 2020 und 2021; different with Federal DPA
- Typically: Advertisement, Scoring, Employment





Data Privacy on Trial V. Where? Claim of Overregulation – 5. Proportionality

- Exuberant?
- Fines and Measures: Too high? Wrong Adressees? Too indeterminate?
 - Calculation of Fines according to Standardized Model (NL; Germ., EDPB)
 - Fines: Ultima Ratio after long stepping up process
 - CJEU 807/21 (Dt. Wohnen): 2017 objection by DPA; 2018 defendant promises new it system; 2020 objection because of inactivity; Oct. 2020 Fine: > 3 years
 - DPA v. Government Fanpage: 06/2018 CJEU Wirtschaftsakademie S-H; 09/2018 DSK; 05/2019 objection DPA; 2021 Denial Gov/Meta; 2022 another objection; 2023 DPA: prohibition: > 5 years



Data Privacy on Trial V. Where? Claim of Overregulation – 5. Proportionality

- Time
 - EDPB decisions
 - Years of prior consultation with data controllers



- No high fining, no exceeding fines
- No surprises: Right to hearing etc. executed repeatedly
- Fines never come singly: adresses, obvious and:
- According to substantial law:
 - Mass data
 - Quality of data breaches
 - Business modell based on data breaches
 - High impact
 - Consequences
 - Ongoing violation (CJEU September 2024 C-768/21)



- Too much uncertainty for Fining, Measures and Damages?
 - Instruments of Enforcement and Compliance clarify
 - Full judicial control
 - App. 100 EDPB-Guidelines etc.
 - About 50 CJEU Decisions on GDPR



Data Privacy on Trial VI. If? Frictions

- Remedies/Actions in Court
 - Parallel, unconnected procedures and decisions in administrative (DPA) and civil courts, no res iudicata/no stare decisis/no rules for pending
 - CJEU C-132/21 (2023)

 Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság: Civil Law not bound by DPA
 - Little Knowledge of Data Protection Law in Courts, in particular by indirect enforcement (competition law, consumer protection law, medical product liability law, ...) -> increase of legal uncertainty and cost (court-of-appeals)
 - Little Knowledge of Data Subjects of typical amount, procedure etc.



Data Privacy on Trial VI. If? Frictions

- Remedies/Actions in Court
 - Remedies only as good as Courts are within Reach
 - Individual subjective right of a data subject, possibility of violation sufficient
 - Low procedural cost (amount in dispute low) = low legal costs
 - Downside: litigation lawyers
 - Extension GDPR:
 - Anyone under scope of GDPR = worldwide
 - Right of data subject to mandate NGO, Art. 80, but: no third party action, no objective right/standing

Data Privacy on Trial VI. If? Frictions

- Remedies/Actions in Court
 - Remedies only as good as Courts are within Reach
 - For priviledged Non-US-Citizens: highly difficult, executive order 14086
 "Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities" =
 Data Protection Review Court against intelligence data measures; no direct
 complaint; no direct access to court; character of EO
 - CCPA: California Consumer Residents only
 - High Scrutiny for standing acc. to Spokeo (2016) and TransUnion LLC v.
 Ramirez (2021): injury/harm (concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent) plus likelihood of causality and redress




- Data Protection Law / GDPR boiling topic
- Dogmatics / Empirics : no legal / factual overregulation
- Enforcement creates:
 - Trust in Rule of Law, equal treatment, level playing field
 - No power asymmetry (primary goal of GDPR!)
 - Room for negotiation
 - Recution of enforcement cost

And

Desired Alteration of behaviour of adressees





Data (and Informationtechnology) are Special Goods.

They appropriate Power.



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Politically, Too.



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Politically, Too.

This needs regulation.

And Enforcement.









